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RECENT CASES
But almost as impressive as the result reached in Wein
v. Crockett was the failure of the Utah court to mention or
rely upon the supporting authority of International Shoe v.
Washington. While that case involved a foreign corporation,
the broad sweep of the court's reasoning invites the applica-
tion of identical criteria in determining the exercise of juris-
diction over both corporations and individuals.21 Rejected as
determinative of jurisdiction were fictional consent, fictional
presence, and the power to exclude-the very bases of former
distinctions between the two situations; distinctions which
are predicated upon no apparent realistic considerations. The
two cases, however, are not dissimilar in their approach. Con-
ceding minor differences, both the Utah case and International
Shoe made "convenience" the determinative factor of juris-
diction rather than employing narrow interpretations of the
police power.2 2 The doctrinal shortcoming of Wein v. Crockett
is that it overcame the greatest obstacles, then failed to take
the additional step of applying International Shoe and merg-
ing the corporate and individual cases under a common au-
thority.
EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINA-
TION - COMPULSORY VOICE EXHIBITION
Taylor, under arrest for rape, and four other men of
the same general appearance were compelled by the sheriff
nonresident as to a foreign corporation. If the mere fact that a corpora-
tion does business within a state constitutes a consent to the conditions
which the state may properly and does impose, it is hard to see why the
doing of business by an individual is not a consent to the conditions
which a state may properly and does impose." Scott, Business Jurisdic-
tion over Nonresidents, 32 HARV. L. RE-. 871, 886 et. seq. (1919).
21. In the International Shoe case, Chief Justice Stone spoke of
individuals as well as corporations as he said, "historically the jurisdic-
tion of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their defacto power over the defendant's person .... But now.., due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantialjustice.'"
22. The main difficulty with the new approach seems to lie in the
vagueness of the terms "fair play," "substantial justice," and " minimum
contacts" utilized in International Shoe v. Washington. The problem,
however, is not wholly unique. For almost a century British courts have
been applying with success similar tests in determining the propriety of
in peraonam jurisdiction in actions against out-of-state defendants. See
Note: British Precedents far Due Process Limitations on In Personarm
Jurisdiction, 48 Cor. L. REv. 605 (1948).
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to line up with their backs toward the prosecuting witness
and repeat specific words, spoken by the rapist at the scene
of the crime. By his voice, Taylor was identified as the
assailant. Upon appeal from a conviction, the Supreme Court
of South Carolina reversed, holding that the admission by
the trial court of testimony to the foregoing facts' violated
the defendant's state constitutional privilege not to ". .. be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.' '2 State v. Taylor, -S. C.-, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948).
Although the privilege against self-incrimination n is in-
corporated into the United States Constitution and virtually
all of the state constitutions, 4 the interpretations of its scope
are anything but uniform. The area of heaviest conflict re-
garding the privilege concerns its applicability to evidence
identifying the accused secured through his own active assist-
ance.5 The existence of two interpretations of the privilege ex-
plains most of the inconsistencies in the cases. The first, which
may be called the narrow-protection, or common law view, ex-
cludes from admission incriminating testimonial evidence ob-
tained from a witness by means of legal compulsion.6 The
1. See note 19a infra.
2. S. C. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 17.
3. The privilege was first evolved in an attempt to check the
inquisitorial abuses of the ecclesiastical courts in putting the accused
upon his oath to supply the lack of witnesses. Ultimately, the privilege
took form as a common law rule of evidence. For an exhaustive dis-
cussion of the history of the privilege, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE Sec.
2250 (3rd ed. 1940); also Corwin, E. S., The Supreme Cour's Con-
struction of the Self-incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv. 1, 191(1930); 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1398 (1938);
Irvine, The Third Degree and the Privilege Against Self-incrimination,
13 CORNELL L. Q. 211 (1927); Wigmore, J., Nemo Tenetur Seipsum
Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1891); Wigmore, J., The Privilege Against
Self-incrimination: Its History, 15 HARv. L. REV. 610 (1902).
4. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 321-326 for a collection of all the
American provisions.
5. Compare People v. Hevern, 127 Misc. Rep. 141, 215 N. Y. Supp.
412 (1926), with United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1932)(fingerprints) ; compare Magee v. State, 98 Miss. 865, 46 So. 529(1908), with State v. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81 (1924)(making footprints); compare Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A. 2d
820 (1944), with Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910) (putting
on certain clothing). For general discussions see Inbau, Self-incrimina-
tion-What Can An Accused Person Be Compelled To Do? 28 J. CRim.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 261 (1937); Comment, To What Extent Does The
Privilege Against Self-incrimination Protect An Accused From Physical
Disclosures? 1 VAND. L. REV. 243 (1948).
6. This view of the privilege is the same as the common law rule of
evidence. Cates v. Hardacre, 3 Taunt. 424, 128 Eng. Rep. 168 (1811);
Regina v. Garbett, 1 Den. 243, 169 Eng. Rep. 230 (1847); 9 HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 197 (1926) ; 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
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second, or broad-protection view, excludes from admission
any incriminating evidence obtained from a person by means
of legal compulsion7
Although the court in the Taylor case purported to fol-
low the narrow, or common law, view, it in fact went beyond
the limits of that interpretation of the privilege., This is
borne out by a consideration of the key requisite9 for the
application of that view: the evidence produced must be a
testimonial fact.10  This involves two factors. First, the
Sec. 2250. Many American jurisdictions approve this concept. See,
e.g., McFarland v. United States, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 196, 150 F.2d 593
(1945); Elmore v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 443, 138 S. W.2d 956 (1940).
See note 10 infra.
7. E.g., in these cases the defendant was held privileged (a) even
though he was not under oath as a witness: Smith v. State, 247 Ala.
354, 24 So.2d 546 (1946) (standing up before jury); Blackwell v. State,
67 Ga. 76, 44 Am. Rep. 717 (exhibiting leg); Beacham v. State, 144
Tex. Crim. Rep. 272, 162 S. W.2d 706 (1942) (exhibiting voice by
speech); Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. Rep. 593 (1941) (handwrit-
ing exhibition); (b) where the defendents, although on the witness
stand (without waiver of the privilege), furnished only non-testimonial
evidence: Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A.2d 820 (1944) (placed hat
on head); Ward v. State, 27 Okla. Crim. 362, 228 Pac. 498 (1924) ; State
v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 117 Pac. 58 (1911) (put on clothes, took gun in
hand).
8. State v. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81 (1924), a previous
South Carolina case, was deemed controlling in the principal decision.
There, the court declared itself to be following the Wigmore narrow-
protection view that the privilege is limited to incriminating testimony.
But testimony is a solemn declaration under oath for the purpose of
proving some fact. O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137 (1890).
By declaring that mere conduct may be testimony, that decision, in
effect, obtained the same results as if the broad-protection view were
followed. Consequently, the Wigmore view was not validly applied in
State v. Griffin. For a criticism of the Griffin case see Note, Ad-
missability of Non-Testimonial Evidence Exorted From The Accused
Person Before And At the Trial, 5 N. C. L. REV. 333 (1927).
Some reliance in the Taylor Case was placed upon Beacham v.
State, 144 Tex. Crim. Rep. 272, 162 S. W.2d 706 (1942), where a pre-
trial compulsory voice exhibition resulting in identification was held
to violate the privilege. That case was erroneously relied upon for two
reasons. Firstly, while the Texas Commission of Appeals decided that
admission of the evidence had violated the privilege against self-in-
crimination, upon rehearing the Court of Criminal Appeals preferred
to place its affirmation upon an untrustworthy confession statute which
had been construed to cover many acts other than confessions. Secondly,
if Beacham v. State is a valid application of the privilege, it represents
only an application of the broad-protection privilege.
9. Broken down, the elements requisite for the exercise of the com-
mon law privilege are these: (1) Compulsion (2) by agency of the law
(3) against a witness (4) resulting in acquisition from the witness (5)
of testimonial facts (6) which tend to incriminate the witness; (7) ab-
sence of waiver of the privilege by the witness; and (8) absence of im-
munity of the witness from prosecution for the crime which would be
imputed to him. 8 WIGIORE, EVIDENCE Secs. 2250-2284 (Chapter LXXX).
10. For a- sampling of those decisions emphasizing the necessity
that testimonial evidence be obtained from a witness, see, e.g., Holt v.
1949]
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person furnishing the evidence must have acted in the
capacity of a witness, i.e., as one bound by oath to speak
the truth or bring forth specific evidence which he has been
ordered to produce.-' Secondly, the truth of the matter com-
municated, or the authenticity of the evidence produced
must be inferred from its assertion or production by that
person.12  In the Taylor case the accused was only a party
under arrest; at no time did he take an oath so as to fall
within the purview of witness. Even if it had been produced
by a witness, the voice is like any other physical attribute
of the body. Its authenticity is known by the observer with-
out any reliance upon the assertion by the speaker that he
is producing his own voice and not that of another. Thus,
a person's voice is not a testimonial fact, and under the
narrow-protection view, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is not exercisable to preclude from admission evidence
derived from a compulsory exhibition of the voice. 3
In effect, the court in the Taylor case, by applying the
privilege to evidence obtained by one not a witness, adopted
the theory of the broad-protectionists. Very probably, where
the broad construction prevails, it has devolved from a literal
application of that particular state's own constitutional
privilege provision, the phrasing of which does not limit
protection to testimonial evidence.14  Obviously, since com-
pulsory incriminating voice exhibition is furnishing evi-
dence against one's self, it would be within the protection
United States, 218 U. S. 345 (1910); United States v. White, 322
U. S. 694 (1944); People v. One Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App.2d 248,
168 P.2d 445 (1946); Boyers v. State, 198 Ga. 838, 33 S. E.2d 251(1945). Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 291, 182 N. E. 865, 868 (1932): "We
do not think that the rule against compulsory self-incrimination properly
applies to pre-trial efforts to identify a suspect as the probable per-
petrator of a crime." Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865, 46 So. 529 (1908);
State v. Cash, 219 N. C. 818, 15 S. E.2d 277 (1941) ; McGovern v. Van
Ripper, 137 N. J. Eq. 548, 45 A.2d 842 (1946); State v. Cram, 176
Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945). See also 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE Secs.
469e-f (16th ed. 1899); PHIPSON, EVIDENCE 198 (8th ed. 1942); 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE Secs. 2263-2265.
11. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 398, 2 id. Secs. 475-479; 8 id. Sec. 2264.
12. See note 11 supra.
13. At least two writers and one court clearly regard compulsory
voice exposition as without the privilege: Johnson v. Commonwealth,
115 Pa. St. 369, 9 Atl. 78 (1887); Inbau, supra note 5 at 281; Com-
ment, 1 VAND. L. REV. 243, 250 (1948).
14. For example, the Alabama and Texas provisions are that the
accused ". . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself."
ALA. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 6; Tnx. CONST. Art. I, See. 10. Compare with
cases cited, note 7 supra.
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afforded by a literal application of this second concept of
the privilege.' 5 However, it is suggested that a proper ap-
plication of the privilege can be made only by a considera-
tion of its underlying purposes. Protagonists of both views
of the privilege deem it to be aimed at protection of the in-
nocent by preventing the degeneration of the investigatory
machinery of the state."6 Thus, when law enforcement offi-
cers are allowed to trust habitually to compulsory self-dis-
closure, "The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such
evidence and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation
of the other sources . . . ultimately, the innocent are jeop-
ardized by the encroachments of a bad system.' 17
It is difficult to see how this reasoning applies to the
type of facts obtained in the Taylor case. Such facts are
obviously the most reliable evidence that can be placed before
a jury or utilized to detect the criminal since they need
no verification and are known to be genuine with reliance
upon no person's testimonial responsibility. Since the only
purpose of such evidence is to determine the guilt or inno-
cence of a person, its inclusion within the privilege does
not protect the innocent, as only their innocence is disclosed.
Rather, only the guilty are protected. To deprive the public
and their law enforcement officers of the best means of
identification of criminals tends to hamper, not improve,
the system of criminal investigation.18 The privilege must
not be so mechanically applied as to needlessly exclude evi-
dence vital to the protection of society without a correspond-
ing promotion of the objects of the privilege. Thus, by
either view, compulsory voice exhibition however incriminat-
15. Beacham v. State, discussed in note 8 supra.
16. "The rule was intended for the protection of the innocent, and
not for that of the guilty." Bartlett v. Lewis, 12 C. B. n.s. 249, 265
(1862). STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRImINAL LAW 342, 441, 565 (1883);
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 316.
For criticism of the privilege, see Irvine, supra note 2, at 215;
Pecora, F., Are the Criminal Courts Doing Their Duty? PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALS' CONFERENCE ON CRIMIE 169, 170 (1934);
Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 86(1891).
17. 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE 309.
18. 8 WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE Sec. 2265; 17 PHIL. L. J. 283, 306 (1938).
For an able discussion of the muzzling effect of constitutional re-
strictions upon the power of society to solve crimes where grounds exist
to suspect an individual, but where the evidence is insufficient to charge
him with guilt, see Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Watts v. Indiana,
69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1357 (1949).
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ing should not fall within the shelter of the privilege against
self-incrimination. If identification of a person by virtue
of evidence, the source and authenticity of which the ob-
server knows without assistance from anyone, is -to be ex-




At the beginning of the 81st Congress the Majority
leaders in the Senate, anticipating obstruction by "filibusters,"
proposed to amend the Senate Rules to provide for more ef-
fective limitation on debate. A motion was made to take up
19. If identification by virtue of compulsory voice exhibition is to
be disallowed, it must be done upon some other ground, such as:
(a) Undue prejudice. The principal case was decided purportedly
as a violation of the privilege. Yet, the court in obscure language,
indicates that the evidence should have been excluded solely because
the specific words'were uttered. If the particular words were such as
would rouse the passion of the jury, the evidence might be subject to
exclusion as unduly prejudicial (6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE: Sec. 1904); but
so far as the privilege itself is concerned, the undue prejudice argument
is irrelevant. Opposing exclusion on an undue prejudice basis is the
fact that the most accurate method of identification is to present the
suspect to the witness in as near as possible the same conditions as
originally observed. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE Sec. 786a. For valuable
discussion see Gorphe, F., Showing Prisoners To Witnesses for Iden-
tification, 1 AM. J. POLICE Sd. 79 (1930).
(b) Unreliability of the Identification. Relatively little research
appears to have been done in this area, but see: 27 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY (1936); McGeehee, F., The Reliability of the Identification
of the Human Voice, 17 J. GEN. PSYCHOLOGY 249 (1937), and comment
thereon in 33 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 487 (1943); McGeehee, F.,
An Experimental Study of Voice Recognition, 31 J. GEN. PSYCHOLOGY
53 (1944). For cases accepting voice identification see 2 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE Sec. 660, n.1.
(c) Violation of procedural due process of the U. S. Const. Amend.
XIV. To date that evidence which has been excluded by virtue of
the due process clause has been only involuntary confessions. However
the scope of procedural due process does not appear to be limited
to confessions, in view of its underlying policy: ". . . to prevent
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false."
Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 62 Sup. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166
(1941); Watts v. Indiana, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1348, n. 2 (1949). But
whether this due process fair trial rule will ever be utilized to compel
the exclusion of non-confessional evidence is an open question.
(d) Waiver. Many courts have avoided a determination of what
constitutes testimony by finding that the accused waived his privilege
when, as a matter of fact, he had no privilege to waive. E.g., People
v. Salas, 17 Cal. App.2d 75, 61 P.2d 771 (1936); State v. Watson,
114 Vt. 543, 49 A.2d 174 (1946); Spitler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46
N. E.2d 591 (1943); State v. Cash, 219 N. C. 818, 15 S. E.2d 277 (1941).
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